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This thesis examines the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of the
inland waterways system during mobilization. The study furnishes a
historical and present-day review of the inland waterways system. The
thesis also addresses the military's current use of the inland waterways
system. The emphasis of the thesis is on exploring the potential cost
savings available in using inland waterway transportation for unit
movements. There is potential for the military to realize sizable cost
savings by moving unit equipment over the inland waterways. The paper
proposes that DOD planners use Gulf coast ports as points of entry for
returning equipment. These Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) capable ports can
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An efficient and effective transportation system is vital to national
defense. The ability to transport troops, equipment, and material quickly
and to mobilize and sustain industrial power is essential in war.
[Ref.l:p.4] During mobilization, the United States Department of Defense
(DOD) depends upon railroads and motor carriers to provide rapid transport
for troops and equipment. Rail and truck modes move troops and equipment
from home bases in the continental United States (CONUS) to departure
ports and airfields. From ports of embarkation (POE), airlift and sealift
forces move troops, arms, and equipment to the overseas sites of
operations. During this first phase of mobilization, the nation's
transportation system must move troops and equipment quickly. [Ref .2:pp.3-
6]
The second phase of mobilization is sustainment. The sustainment
phase requires the DOD transportation system to move troops, equipment,
and arms to the projected force until no longer required by the mission.
Sustainment also involves the movement of raw materials to the nation's
industrial base. For this phase of mobilization, DOD transportation
planning depends heavily upon inland navigation to move the raw materials
necessary to support the industrial base.
During World War II, the inland navigation system proved to be an
important strategic resource. The inland waterways were instrumental in
1
the home front industrial mobilization effort. The inland waterways made
up the essential link in the petroleum transportation network. Barges
also moved other strategic raw materials. In addition, inland rivers
provided a thoroughfare for military vessels built at inland shipyards.
[Ref.3:pp. 17-18]
Since World War II, the military has continued to use the inland
waterways for the movement of bulk petroleum products. Today 95 percent
of the total cargo moved on the inland waterways by the DOD consists of
bulk petroleum products. [Ref.4:p.6] Military interest in the inland
waterways for other uses, including unit movements, has been low.
Traditionally, military transportation officers have selected motor and
rail carriers for the movement of finished goods and unit equipment.
In 1986, the Army National Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers
completed several test movements of unit equipment using the inland
navigation system. These successful movements showed substantial
transportation savings and generated increased interest by the military in
the use of the inland waterway system.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, inland waterway transportation has become
increasingly important to the Department of Defense. This study evaluates
the inland waterway system's potential during national mobilization.
The United States is a large, diverse land area intersected by
streams, rivers, and bays. When Europeans began exploration of this land,
they found more than three million square miles of untamed wilderness. To
civilize such a large area meant that transportation had to become a
leading industry of the nation. [Ref.l:p.l6] Overland travel was slow on
the roads of colonial America. It was often easier to use water
transportation. Water carriage developed into the main type of domestic
transportation for many decades. Chapter II chronicles the development of
this transportation mode. The chapter also explores the inland waterways'
impacts on American life, including the military.
If mobilized, the nation would depend on the inland waterways to
transport the bulk war materials necessary for defense. Chapter III
describes the physical inland waterway system that these bulk commodities
would move over. In addition, Chapter III profiles the equipment and
facilities of the inland navigation industry. The chapter also gauges the
adequacy of the inland navigation system to support national defense
mobilization efforts.
Recent movements by Army units on the inland waterway system have
shown sizable cost savings while providing training on a new
transportation mode. Chapter IV examines these movements to consider
those aspects of inland navigation transportation that have the potential
to benefit the military.
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations which includes a
discussion of the contributions of the inland waterways during
mobilization.
C. SCOPE
The Mississippi River System dominates the nation's inland waterway
navigation system. The Mississippi River System, when combined with the
Gulf-Intracoastal Waterway, provides waterborne commerce to the heartland
of the nation. [Ref.5:p.l] Most of the recent waterborne military unit
movements have occurred on these two waterway systems. This study of the
military's use of inland navigation focuses on the Mississippi River
System and the Gulf-Intracoastal Waterway.
II. HISTORY OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS SYSTEM
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
From the days of the earliest settlements, the abundance of natural
waterways in North America have played an important role in the
development of this nation [Ref.6:p.9]. This chapter will provide a brief
survey of the traffic that has travelled over the inland waterways. The
purpose of this historical review is to provide a foundation for future
chapters that will explore the military potential of the inland waterways.
This chapter will examine three periods in the development of the
waterways and explore both civilian and military influences.
1. The First Period: 1620 - 1865
The first period began in the early seventeenth century with the
use of natural waterways as passageways of exploration. Later, the rivers
served as highways of settlement since people could only penetrate the
interior where rivers made it possible. [Ref.6:p.9] The few roads built
during the colonial period were mainly large cleared paths with surfaces
of beaten earth, planks, or broken stone [Ref .7:p.86] . One famous road of
the period was the Wilderness Road. This heavily travelled road ran from
Virginia southwest through the Cumberland Gap, but it was not made
passable for wheeled traffic until the 1790s. [Ref.7:p.85]
"The new nation found itself economically anchored to the coastal
plain in its first decades of existence." [Ref.8:p.79]
As settlement gradually spread west and south from the East Coast, the
question then became how to improve the transportation of commerce between
the different regions. The few major roads that existed were inadequate
to move the crops of the western farmers and the industrial goods produced
by the manufacturers in the East. [Ref.8:p.79]
Because of inadequate roads and expensive, inefficient freight-wagon
transportation, western farmers lost twenty to fifty percent of the value
of their crops while transporting them to their seaboard customers
[Ref .8:p.80]. The need for more efficient methods of moving material led
to a greater awareness of the nation's inland waterways and to the
building of numerous canals. Between 1790 and 1860, more than 4,250 miles
of hand-dug artificial waterways were constructed in America.
[Ref. 8:pp. 81-90]
These canals led to significantly lowered transportation costs.
Western farmers were able to dispose of their agriculture surplus at a
greater profit while letting their eastern neighbors eat better for less.
As a result, a greater portion of money was available to spend on non-food
goods. [Ref.8:p.90] Real incomes in the West and in the East rose as a
result of the canals. The expansion of productive transportation
increased the economic activity in both regions. Canals promoted the
growth of commercial farming and industrial activities, while developing
the basis for the rapid growth of cities along their banks [Ref .9:p.247].
By connecting the East and West, the canals started a series of economic
interactions that are still present today in the form of the national
industrial economy [Ref .8:p.91].
Even while the canal building movement was at its height, the
development of the steamboat was signalling the end of the canal building
era. From the early 1800s to the Civil War, transportation on the
Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio Rivers enjoyed significant growth during
the period of the steamboats. The course of steamboat growth is shown in
Table 1.
TABLE 1
NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF STEAMBOATS OPERATING ON THE

























The Civil War marked the end of the first period of waterway
transportation. The engaging armies moved along the rivers, burning or
sinking hundreds of river vessels [Ref .8:p.283]. This conflict destroyed
the freight and passenger traffic patterns that had been formed by
steamboats before the war. When peace came, the pressure from the
railroad competition was too much for a commercial rebirth on the inland
waterways. [Ref .8:p.283]
In contrast to the inland waterways, the Civil War strengthened the
railroads, excluding the southern railroads. War needs had created track
expansion, increased efficiency in track construction, and new methods of
handling freight on trains. Wartime demands forced the change from iron
to steel rails and caused a shift in fuel sources from wood to coal.
[Ref.llipp. 62-63]
2. The Second Period: 1865 - 1890
The second period lasted about thirty years after the Civil War.
During this time, the railroads became the clear leader in the competition
for the domestic transportation market. The railroads made some gains as
a result of abuses against the water carriers. The railroads purchased
steamboat lines only to let the vessels sit at their moorings and rot.
They also purchased steamboat lines and operated the boats at a loss to
eliminate other steamboat lines. [Ref .8:p.284] However, history may more
fairly credit the ascendancy of the railroads, at the expense of the
inland waterways, to the competitive advantages of the railroads. The
railroads offered year-round reliable service, whereas the waterways could
not match the speed, frequency, and accessibility. The superior service
of the railroad lines was not because of a desire to give the paying
public maximum service, but inherent in the essential conditions under
which railroads operated [Ref .10:p.501]. In contrast with the fierce
competition that existed on the rivers between steamship lines, railroads
had a virtual monopoly within the territories they served. For the small
steamboat operators, it was imperative to get all the freight and
passenger business available on any trip, even if it meant frequent
delays. The railroads didn't have that problem. What one train left, the
next train would pick up. In addition, the railroads could quickly adapt
to freight volume by adding or dropping cars. Steamboats had to move a
fixed hull and superstructure through the water, whether the cargo was
large or small. [Ref.lO:pp. 500-501]
Another advantage for the railroads was accessibility. Nature forced
the inland waterway system to operate within a fixed trunk and branch
network. To materially extend that range was slow and expensive, while
the railroad network continued to expand at a rapid rate after the war.
In the thirty years after the Civil War, track mileage grew from 30,000
miles in 1860 to 167,000 miles by 1890. [Ref .8:p.283]
The inland waterways entered a period of neglect after the Civil War.
On the other hand, rail transportation continued its climb toward command
of the dominant position in domestic transport for both freight and
passenger movement. Yet, as commerce on the inland waterways declined,
technical developments in marine engineering led to the development of
screw propeller propulsion systems that were more efficient than the old
sternwheel driven boats. The emergence of screw propeller boats and the
adoption of towboats and barges to replace the packet steamships helped
prepare for the third or modern period of the inland waterways.
[Ref.3:p.6]
3. The Third Period: 1890 - Present
As the nation entered the last decade of the 19th century,
farmers and merchants were tiring of railroad abuses, especially high
rates [Ref . 11 :p. 123]
.
At the turn of the century Charles A. Prouty (1853-1921), member
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, asked a railroad traffic
official the basis on which his rates were made. The official
replied: 'To be perfectly honest, we get all we can, and even that is
too little.' [Ref.ll:p.l23]
Complaints against the railroads led to congressional interest in the
inland waterways. Congress viewed the waterways as an inexpensive
transportation alternative and as a way to control the railroads. "In
1907, President Roosevelt appointed the Inland Waterways Commission to
study the needs and possibilities of the waterways." [Ref .8:p.286]
All of this interest and enthusiasm bore fruit in the Panama Canal
Act of 1912, the legislative keystone for the revival of inland
transportation. The act decreed that railroads could not own,
control, or operate a water carrier. [Ref .8:pp. 286-287]
During World War I, the war's massive demands on the transportation
system spurred a renewed interest in more effective use of the waterways.
After World War I, the federal government provided additional support to
water carriers by creating the Inland and Coastwise Waterways Service in
1918. [Ref .8:p.287] Congress then passed the Transportation Act of 1920
which declared the intent of Congress to promote, develop, and encourage
water transportation in the United States [Ref .8:p.287].
This declaration of intent was given reality in 1924 when Congress
created the Inland Waterways Corporation, (IWC). The IWC was a publicly
owned corporation tasked to prove the transportation capabilities of
modern towboats and barges by operating a federal barge line.
[Ref .8:p.287] The corporation included five million dollars in capital
stock investment held by the United States government. Control of the
enterprise was given over to the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE). The USACE and the IWC undertook an orderly improvement of the
nation's waterways to support modern navigation practices on the inland
waterways. The IWC showed to the private sector the profitability of the
inland waterways. From 1924 to 1938, the IWC made a net profit of $2.9
10
million. [Ref.3:p.5]. During the corporation's lifetime, the IWC made
important advances in the development of modern towboats and barges and
helped river communities build port terminals [Ref.3:p.6]. The success of
the IWC and USACE from 1924 to 1940 was evident by the increase in tonnage
moved on the inland waterways. In 1924, the inland waterways moved
slightly more than 34 million short tons. 1 By 1940, the tonnage had
increased to 70.2 million short tons. [Ref .8:p.287]
When the nation entered World War II, about 1,000 towboats and 5,000
barges plied the inland waterways. The war years reshaped and
strengthened inland navigation. The mobilization effort opened new
markets and traffic patterns for the inland waterway industry.
Additionally, the contribution of the waterways during the war helped the
inland waterway industry get Congressional approval for further navigation
and harbor projects. The influx of federal dollars, coupled with the
general boom of the post-war period, aided the continued growth of the
inland waterway industry. [Ref .3:pp. 8-22] The following chapter examines
existing conditions and physical structures of the inland waterways.
B. MILITARY HISTORY OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS
The military used America's inland waterways to move men and equipment
to some of the earliest conflicts fought on American shores. River
transport of the military played a role during the French and Indian Wars
and the American Revolutionary War. The rivers carried a variety of
traffic ranging from scouting canoes to small supply sloops. However, it
A short ton equals 2,000 pounds
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wasn't until the successful introduction of steam power to water vessels
that the waterway system provided the upstream capability needed by the
military. Under the conditions of inland navigation, sail power was of
limited value and the swift currents that supported downstream navigation
could only be offset by human energy or, in some cases, horses to move men
and equipment upstream. The successful introduction of the steamboat to
the inland waterways in 1807 gave the military the ability to defy the
currents with the resulting strategic and logistic mobility.
Five years after the introduction of steam to the inland waters,
steamboats were transporting military stores. During the War of 1812,
steamboats travelled from Pittsburgh to New Orleans in the support of
General Jackson's defense of New Orleans. [Ref . 10: p. 551
]
In the years preceding the Civil War, steamboat design and operation
improved. The military increasingly used river transportation to carry
troops and supplies to the remote army forts of the West. The
Mississippi, Missouri, Arkansas, and Red Rivers had considerable troop and
equipment movement to support combat operations against hostile Indians.
[Ref . 10
:
p . 552] During the Mexican War, Army forts along the shores of the
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers used steamboats to move troops, horses, and
supplies to the point of embarkation at New Orleans [Ref . 10:p.553]
.
1. The Civil War
The outbreak of the Civil War threatened to mark the end of
steamboating as a business. [Ref . 12
:
p. 21 ] As the Civil War progressed,
railroads became the method of choice for the movement of war material and
personnel.
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However, Northern armies found that the navigable tributaries of the
Ohio and Mississippi River systems provided thoroughfares that led into
the center of the Confederacy [Ref . 10:p.554]. General Sherman wrote of
another advantage to rivers. He stated that his forces could easily
defend rivers because there were no bridges or rails for raiders to
destroy.
We are much obliged to the Tennessee which has favored us most
opportunely, for I am never easy with a railroad which takes a whole
army to guard, each foot of rail being essential to the whole;
whereas they can't stop the Tennessee, and each boat can make its own
game. [Ref .10:p.555]
Besides defense, the rivers were superior to the railroads in carrying
capacity. Single-track rail lines could only accommodate a limited number
of trains daily. [Ref .10:p.555] Plus, the construction and design of
steamboats allowed the military to bring the boats ashore almost anywhere
and disembark troops and horses. Where railroad and steamboat services
were both available, lower steamboat costs prompted the use of the river.
[Ref.l0:p.555]
During the Civil War, the northern military found the inland waterway
transportation to offer advantages of ample capacity and low cost.
However, there were two disadvantages to the inland waterways. First,
planners had to adapt logistic and operational plans to work around
seasonal high and low water levels. The second disadvantage lay with the
organization of service. The railroads offered large, established
organizations that could meet the demands of the government in a
systematic manner. The waterways' interests were numerous and could not
provide a substantial, stable body for the government to negotiate
contracts. [Ref .10:p.556]
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2. World War I
During World War I, the inland waterways made two primary
contributions to the war effort: the movement of bulk traffic consisting
of coal, oil, iron, steel, sulfur, and limestone; and as the secondary
mover for freight that rail would move under normal peacetime conditions.
By the fall of 1917, the nation was experiencing shortages of freight
cars. East Coast ports had some 180,000 loaded freight cars at freight
terminals while the national shortage of cars was 158,000. In December
1917, the government took control of the railroads in an attempt to break
this jam of back-logged foodstuffs, armament, and military equipment.
[Ref . 11
:
pp. 184-186] The government also turned to the rivers as a source
of transportation help. At the request of the War Department, old wooden
crafts were reconditioned and put back into service. The War Department
also encouraged the building of new barges and towboats. The cost of a
barge was less than the equivalent train of rail cars, and inland
shipyards could build towboats as fast as the rail industry could build a
locomotive. "Rounding up all the tonnage that would float, building new
barges and towboats, merging local carriers into a transportation system,
the government formed the Federal Barge Lines." [Ref .13:p.259] After the
war, the Federal Barge Line became the Inland and Coastwise Waterways
Service [Ref.3:p.4].
3. World War II
Shortly after the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl
Harbor, German submarines began destroying cargo ships off the Atlantic
and Gulf Coasts. These high shipping losses in the early months of the
14
war required transferring material normally handled by coastwise shipping
to protected inland waterways. This move was also influenced by the
decision in early 1942 to assign all ocean tankers to convoy duty.
[Ref.3:p.l2]
Not only were defense transportation planners faced with trying to
find ways of developing additional capacity, they also needed to develop
new plans for commodity movement. The demands of war production and
shipping threats forced changes within the transportation system. The
railroads, motor carriers, and tow and barge industries were moving
unfamiliar commodities between unfamiliar origin and destination points.
[Ref.3:p.l2] "The war upset the normal balance of distance, load, and
back-haul." [Ref.3:p.l2]
In the spring of 1942, an "energy crisis" developed on the East Coast.
Most naval ships and almost all merchant ship convoys that were
transporting material to the European theater bunkered on the East Coast.
At the height of this crisis, the daily shortfall exceeded 175,000
barrels. The Office of Defense Transportation (ODT) turned to the inland
waterways for the answer to this crisis. The waterways offered many
advantages including cost and flexibility. The barge industry's nearest
competitor, pipelines, charged 3.2 mills compared to 1.25 mills per ton
mile for barge movement. The study showed that shifting oil to barges
could be done quickly because operators could assemble tows piecemeal as
equipment became available. The inland waterways provided needed
flexibility in drop-off and pick-up points. Finally, the waterways
industry could easily convert barges and towboats from war to peacetime
use. Further analysis also indicated that the nation could save the same
15
types of costs by using the waterways to move other commodities in
addition to petroleum. [Ref.3:pp. 13-14]
The most significant contribution of the inland waterway system to the
war effort was the movement of petroleum and petroleum products. The
inland fleet moved 1.8 billion barrels during World War II. The average
tow was 5,000 tons or roughly 125 freight cars. [Ref.3:p.l4]
While petroleum and petroleum products made up most of the inland
waterways contribution to the war effort, other strategic bulk materials
moved on the waterways included coal and steel. In addition, the
Mississippi River System also served as a conduit to the ocean for Army,
Navy, and auxiliary vessels built at inland shipyards. Table 2 shows the
breakdown of the almost four thousand vessels that floated down the Ohio
and Mississippi Rivers during the war. [Ref.3:p.l7]
TABLE 2
NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BY RIVER SHIPYARDS
Quantity Type Location
180 LST's Ohio River Yards
124 LST's Illinois River Yards
17 AOG Navy Tankers Savage Minnesota on the
Mississippi River
13 Army Supply Ships Tennessee River
12 Destroyer Escorts Ohio River Yards
3 Tugboats St. Louis
4 ATL's Neville Island
Shipyard Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania
Note: There were also 17 destroyer escorts and a number of
submarines built at Great Lakes Yards and brought down the




Military use of the inland waterways goes back to the founding
of this nation. The invention of the steamboat with its upstream
capability enlarged the military potential of the rivers. The Civil War
demonstrated that the military could move large forces of men and supplies
efficiently on the inland waterways. World War I showed the capability of
the inland waterways to supplement the railroads during a nationwide
mobilization effort.
The inland waterways proved to be a robust transportation system
during World War II. The vast network of waterways made two major
contributions to the victory. The waterway system was essential to the
movement of petroleum products to the East Coast and the inland waterways
provided passage for military craft built at inland shipyards. In
addition, the waterways served in a supplemental role for other commodity
movements.
One of the reasons the railroads and the inland waterways were the
primary movers of material during the war was the limited highway system.
By 1921, only 387,000 miles of America's roads were paved and less than
four percent of freight moved on the roads [Ref .7:p.ll2]. After World War
II, the federal government set into place a program for an interstate
highway system. Improved military mobilization was one of the primary
goals of this program. In the postwar years, the highway system improved
and usage increased, yet interest in waterborne movement by the military
declined. This study discusses the rediscovery of the inland waterways by
the military.
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III. THE PRESENT INLAND WATERWAYS INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
"The physical transportation plant of the United States is composed
of a variety of types of rights of way, terminal facilities, vehicles
which provide locomotive power and which contain space for freight or
passengers, communications equipment to facilitate centralized operational
or managerial supervision or control over far-flung activities, and
numerous forms of specialized accessorial equipment designed to make the
transportation process more efficient or to cater to the needs of
particular types of freight or passenger traffic." [Ref.l:p.49]
Railroads, highways, pipelines, airlines, and waterways are the
primary agencies responsible for moving domestic freight in this complex
transportation system. This chapter will present the important physical
features and characteristics associated with one of these key transport
modes, the inland waterways.
The first section of the chapter displays the commodity groups that
move on the inland waterways, including Department of Defense (DOD)
movements. The next section describes the five principal inland waterway
systems. The third section of the chapter reviews the physical equipment
and facilities on the inland waterways. The fourth section of the chapter
discusses the influence of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) on the inland waterway system. The first four sections of the
chapter provide a broad-brush profile of the inland waterway industry.
18
The final section of the chapter attempts to determine the appropriateness
of the industry to support national mobilization efforts.
B. COMMERCE ON THE INLAND WATERWAYS
Commodity groups that show the most advantage for waterborne movements
are large bulk cargos that have little urgency about their movement.
[Ref . 15
:
p . 230] As shown in Table 3, petroleum and petroleum products
accounted for 35.5 percent of total tonnage moved on the inland waterways
in 1988.
TABLE 3
























Dry bulk commodities such as coal, sand, gravel and stone, and grain
accounted for another 42.3 percent of total tonnage. As indicated by
Tables 4, 5, and 6, the commodity mix on the inland waterways has remained
fairly constant over the past three decades. As shown in Table 7, DOD
primarily uses the inland waterways to ship petroleum products.
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C. PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS SYSTEM
A series of slack-water pools, free-flowing rivers, and coastal canals
make up the nation's inland waterways system [Ref .20:p. 145] . The
principal physical components of the Inland Waterways system are
illustrated in Figure 1. This waterway system provides 25,777 miles of
commercially navigable rivers and canals exclusive of the Great Lakes.
More than 15,350 miles of this inland waterway system have a channel depth
of at least nine feet. For most commodities, water carriers consider
seven and one-half feet the minimum operating depth for economical opera-
tions. [Ref . 22
:
p . 312] In addition to carrying the nation's freight, the
inland waterways serve as a water resource provider. Irrigation,
hydropower, flood control, municipal and industrial supply, fish and





The principal inland waterway systems are:
1. The New York State Barge Canal : This canal traverses the state and
connects New York Harbor with the Great Lakes system and the St.
Lawrence Seaway [Ref . 23:p. 270] . Unique among the inland waterways,
the state maintains and operates this canal. All other inland
waterways are federal projects. [Ref.6:p.l3] The canal system has
widths ranging from 75 to 200 feet and a minimum depth of twelve
feet. There are 34 locks in the 522 mile canal. Unfortunately,
small lock capacity has limited navigation to local traffic.
[Ref.8:p.295]
2. The Atlantic Intracoastal Waterways System : This series of natural
coastal bays and connecting channels reaches from Boston,
Massachusetts to southern Florida. A series of tributary rivers and
manmade canals on the eastern seaboard feed this protected inland
waterway. [Ref .8:p.293]
3. The Mississippi River System : The nation's largest connected
waterway system has more than 8,954 miles of improved waterways and
flows into 18 states. [Ref .8:p.288] This system provides direct
connection for shallow draft vessels to both the Great Lakes and the







The trunk of this system is the 2,348 mile Mississippi River.
Due to sudden changes of course, its length varies by 40-50 miles
per year. [Ref .24:p.830] The navigable section of the Mississippi
River begins at Minneapolis, Minnesota and flows in a southerly
direction to the Gulf of Mexico at New Orleans. The inland
waterways industry divides the river into two sections, the upper
Mississippi and the lower Mississippi. The upper reach of the
Mississippi (Minneapolis to the mouth of the Missouri River, just
above St. Louis) includes 663 miles of navigable waterway and 27
dams and locks. [Ref ,8:p.288] The lower reach of the Mississippi
(St. Louis to New Orleans) provides more than 1,000 miles of open
river. The major tributaries to the Mississippi River system
include the Ohio River, Missouri River, Illinois Waterway, and
Arkansas River. [Ref.25:p.8]
4. The Gulf Intracoastal Waterways System : This system provides 1,108
miles of protected waterways along the Gulf coast and extends from
the St. Marks River at Jacksonville, Florida to Brownsville, Texas.
About one-half of the waterway uses existing lakes, bays, and other
natural water bodies. [Ref .8:p.291] A large system of feeder
waterways connect with the Gulf Intracoastal Waterways, including
the Tennessee-Tombigbee system and the Mississippi River. Barge
operators use New Orleans to divide the system into an eastern
section and a western section. [Ref.25:p.9]
5. The Pacific Coast Waterways System : The Columbia and Snake River
system provides 340 miles of navigable waters from Lewiston, Idaho,
through the state of Washington, to the Pacific Ocean.
[Ref.23:p.270] The Willamette River, with 132 miles of improved
channels and the 245 mile Sacramento River system are the other
major Pacific navigation channels. [Ref .8:p.289]
D. EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES ON THE INLAND WATERWAYS
1. Industry Structure
About 800 towing companies operate more than 36,000 pieces of
equipment over the inland waterways system. These companies employ more
than 176,000 people. Personnel are employed both aboard the inland fleet
and in shore-based work directly connected with towboat and barge
companies. [Ref. 16] Today the inland waterways industry has an
estimated 5,188 towboats and tugs with a total horsepower of 8,550,068.
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These companies operate a fleet of 31,000 dry and liquid cargo barges with
a combined carrying capacity of 45 million net tons. [Ref.16]
2. Towboats and Tugboats
A wide variety of towboats and tugboats make up the vessels that
work on the inland waterways today. Modern towboats and tugboats have the
typical dimensions and horsepower shown in Figure 2.
Tugboats: Operators use tugboats for pull-towing operations. These
"on-the-hip operations" often take place in an industrial harbor or in
open water along the Atlantic and Gulf Intracoastal Waterways.
[Ref.23:p.272]
Towboats: The industry uses towboats for push-towing operations
where surrounding land masses protect the water routes. They also use
towboats where the waters are either calm in their natural state or where
a system of locks and dams creates slack water. [Ref.6:pp. 10-11]
Compared to push-towing, pull-towing operations severely limits the
number of barges a power unit can move. For the more efficient push-
towing method, towboat crews lash barges ridgedly together, side by side
and back to front, to form a single tow. Then, they securely lash the
barge tow to the boat's flat towing knees at the forward end of the boat.
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Figure 2 Inland River Power Units
Source: [Ref.15]
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The industry divides towboats into three groups based on their rated
horsepower:
1. Towboat companies use low horsepower fleetboats to bundle and sort
barges alongside terminals. These 700 to 1500 horsepower workboats
also move barges to and from fleeting areas, and to break off or add
barges to linehaul tows moving in midstream.
2. Medium horsepower, 1,500 - 5,000 horsepower, linehaul towboats make
up the bulk of the industry's available horsepower. They move most
of the multiple barge tows on all waterways.
3. High horsepower, 5,000 - 10,500 horsepower, linehaul towboats push
the larger tows on the swift, but broad expanses of the lower
Mississippi River. [Ref.5:p.5]
Highly efficient and dependable diesel engines power most modern
towboats. By using reversing-reduction gears, the shafts transfer the
developed energy efficiently to the vessel's propellers. A common
powerplant consists of twin diesels mated to a pair of four blade
propellers with a gear ratio of 4.1:1 to 4.9:1. [Ref.27:p.7]
Modern pilothouses rise as high as 40 feet above the water to give
boat pilots better visibility over the barge tows. Sophisticated
electronic equipment, such as radar and depth finders, allow round-the-
clock operations in all kinds of weather and channel conditions.
[Ref .8:p.289] Standard equipment on towboats include electronic steering
and engine controls, automatic electric bilge pumps, searchlights and
airhorns, and a variety of radio communications.
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3. Barges
One of the strengths of the inland waterway industry is the
ability to carry heavy bulk commodities in specifically designed vessels.
As the quantity of packaged goods diminished from inland waterways
commerce, water carriers developed barges to carry a variety of bulk
commodities. These commodities included: coal, ores, grain, iron and
steel products, petroleum and petroleum products, chemicals, and building
materials. [Ref .23:p.271]
Figure 3 illustrates the four basic types of barges. The most common
forms are the hopper types of barges.
Open hopper barges transport dry cargo commodities which do not
require protection from the weather. Weather- impervious commodities
commonly moved by these barges include coal, steel and ore, gravel, and
lumber. [Ref .23:p.272] Covered dry cargo hopper barges, with sliding
weathertight hatch covers, transport commodities which require protection
from adverse weather elements. Such goods include grains and agricultural
products, paper products, and salt. [Ref .23:p.272]
Deck barges carry heavy and outsized equipment such as construction
equipment, oil rig equipment, and military vehicles and equipment.
[Ref.23:p.272]
Liquid cargo tank barges move the biggest commodity loads on the
inland waterways, which are petroleum and petroleum products. In addition
to petroleum products, tank barges also move chemicals, liquid
fertilizers, and fruit juice. [Ref .23:p.272]
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Figure 3 Inland River Barge Types
Source: [Ref.28]
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4. Inland Ports and Terminals
To support the growth of the inland waterways, river terminals
have evolved into complex intermodal transportation and distribution
centers. Today, specialized or general cargo terminals make up the modern
inland port. These terminals provide for the handling of freight to and
from barges. Each terminal usually serves one type of commodity and will
have docks, storage areas, and cargo transfer facilities. [Ref .29:p.491]
Typical dry bulk terminals can handle the transfer of any type of dry
material. Common dry commodities shipped outbound to barge or inbound to
truck or rail include such products as grains, coal, and ore. [Ref. 30]
Covered and dry storage facilities are also available at dry bulk
terminals.
Modern public liquid terminals consist of a tank farm and a dock-
barge. The transfer rate for discharging or loading bulk liquid can reach
3,000 barrels per hour. The liquid products transferred from railcars,
trucks, and barges include: caustic soda, liquid fertilizer, petroleum
products, and soybean oil. [Ref. 30]
Public general cargo terminals have heavy- lift capability cranes and
conveyors with high ton per hour capacity. Many general cargo terminals
have Roll-on/Roll-off (R0/R0) capability. 2
In addition to waterway facilities, rail and truck transportation
modes provide linkage to off -port transportation, distribution,
manufacturing, and commercial facilities [Ref. 30]. These transportation
modes require access to the port and a significant amount of space within
2 RO/RO capability allows loading and unloading without
the use of dockside cranes.
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the defined port area. Each mode requires space to park full and empty
units, service areas, and space to load and unload the units. [Ref.30]
The efficiency and capacity of an inland port's harbor and fleeting
service also determines cargo capacity and transfer rate. Tows stopping
at the port will either travel directly to a terminal for service or move
to a fleeting area to await switching and shuttle service. [Ref .29:p.490]
5. Locks and Dams
Winter freezes, spring thaws, and summer droughts produce wide
variations in the depths of a natural river. To permit year-round
navigation on such rivers, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) uses a series of dams to maintain a constant depth. The dams play
an important part in providing enough deep water for navigation activities
and acting as a source of flood control. [Ref . 15
:
p. 220] To move river
traffic from one level to another level created by the dams, the USACE
constructs, operates, and maintains navigation locks. [Ref . 15
:
p. 219]
Navigation locks on the inland waterways are chambers that fill with
water. They hydraulically raise and lower their elevation to accommodate
passage between two waterway levels of different depth. Typical lock
sizes are 110 by 600 feet and 110 by 1,200 feet. [Ref .15:pp. 216-217]
On the inland waterways, locks are the primary cause of bottlenecks
and delays. Three factors contribute to the time limiting influence of
locks: lockage time, multiple lockages, and lockage congestion.
Towboat operators allow about thirty minutes as the average amount of
time for a barge tow to pass through a lock. Four parts make-up this
lockage time. [Ref .31:pp. 430-431]
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1. The approach time - time necessary for a tow to move from an
approach point to the lock gate sill.
2. Entry time - time measured from when the tow's bow crosses the sill
until the crew secures the tow in the chamber.
3. Chambering time - time measured from when the crew secures the tow
in the chamber, exit gates are recessed, and the horn has sounded.
4. Exit time - time measured from when the horn sounds until the tow
reaches the approach point. [Ref.31:pp. 430-431]
As stated earlier, the USACE estimates the average lockage time at
thirty minutes. However, when multiple lockage occurs, one to one and a
half hours per tow is not unusual. [Ref .15:p.220]
Multiple lockage occurs when tow size, the number of its barges,
exceeds the lock chamber size. When this occurs, the towboat's crew must
separate the tow's fleet of barges, lock them through in several cuts, and
reassemble the tow. Break-up and reassembly of the tow causes the
multiple lockage to take even more time than locking different tows, each
less than chamber size. For a lock chamber with a capacity of 17 barges
and one towboat, a tow with 18 barges takes longer than two tows with 17
barges each. [Ref . 31
:
p. 758]
Congestion is a function of lock capacity and traffic characteristics.
The previous paragraph discussed the time constraints imposed when tows
reach lock capacity. Traffic characteristics that influence congestion
include:
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1. Size of the tow - the number of barges
2. Draft of the unit - the draft affects speed and maneuverability
3. Direction of travel - imbalanced traffic
4. Itinerary followed - route through bottleneck locks [Ref.6:p.92]
Regardless of the cause of congestion, the user still incurs costs.
"When a tow and its barges wait in a queue to transit a lock, excess
payments for crews and fuel are made, returns to capital are foregone, and
payments for cargo are postponed." [Ref .32:p.759]
E. THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (USACE)
More than a 150 years ago, Congress authorized the United States Army
Corps of Engineers to develop the inland waterways for commercial
navigation. The USACE has been responsible for planning, construction,
maintenance, improving, and operating inland waterways, including harbors.
Their responsibilities include:
1. Developing engineering feasibility and cost studies
2. Performing economic analysis
3. Providing to Congress overall justification data for river and
harbor improvements
4. Maintaining channels at their authorized depth and width
5. Maintenance of harbors, including jetties and breakwaters
6. Providing navigation lighting and marking
7. Modernization of system locks
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8. Removal of obstructions that could hinder navigation on the inland
waterways [Ref.6:pp. 16-17]
In addition to navigation, Congress charged the USACE to consider the
nation's total water needs. These include flood control, agriculture,
industry, recreation, the supply and quality of water, and the generation
of hydroelectric power. [Ref .33:p.40]
"In the past decade, the number of uses for existing waterways has
increased substantially." [Ref .33:p.40] Waterway users now view the
inland waterway system as another source of income. In addition to
navigation, the commercial fishing, hydropower, irrigation, and recreation
interests are also competing for water [Ref .33:p.40]. These increased
demands on the waterways coupled with concurrent droughts and floods have
increased public awareness of USACE management of the inland waterway
system.
Recently, user groups have banded together to pressure Congress to
force the USACE to change its water allocation priorities. Three states
have filed a lawsuit to prevent water releases from state reservoirs.
These releases are necessary to keep miles of rivers navigable for barge
traffic. [Ref .33:p.42] The USACE maintains that navigation is its number
one priority. The USACE further argues that it does not have the
authority to withdraw support from navigation and that it only releases
enough water to support minimal barge traffic. [Ref .33:p.42]
34
F. MOBILIZATION AND THE INLAND WATERWAYS
The inland waterways provide about one-sixth of the nation's freight
transportation [Ref . 34:p. 142] . If mobilization occurs, many elements of
the waterways structure could expand their capacity.
1. Ports and Terminals
The transfer times of towboat and barge cargoes at inland
waterway ports depend upon a variety of factors. These factors include
the facilities, equipment, and labor skills provided by the terminals that
make up the port. The competence and capacity of the fleeting service
used by the port also influences cargo capacity. In the short term, these
characteristics do not lend themselves to emergency expansion. However,
analytical models of inland port operations show that terminals could
realize some short term improvements. According to one model, improving
material handling equipment and extending operating periods could
significantly increase terminal capacity and reduce total load and unload
time. [Ref. 29:pp. 490-497]
2. Rivers and Channels
Open river navigation could rapidly expand to meet increased
mobilization demands. The primary bottleneck occurs where locks and dams
make slack water navigation possible. The 167 locks that make up the
inland system have a median age of 35 years. Many of these locks are
requiring increased amounts of maintenance to insure their continuous
operation. Additionally, lengthy and expensive delays at some of the
older locks have become common as traffic reaches the lock's capacity
[Ref .4:p.ll]. The modernization of a waterway is a lengthy and expensive
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project, as shown by the modernization of the Black Warrior-Tombigbee
navigation system. The dedication of the $118 million William Bacon
Oliver lock on August 17,1991 completed a modernization program that began
in 1954. The new 600 by 110 foot structure replaced a 460 by 95 foot lock
opened in 1939. In total, the federal government has $237 million
invested on the Black Warrior-Tombigbee Waterway. [Ref.35:p.5]
3. Towboats and Barges
Studies have found that the normal use of tugs, towboats, and
barges is about 65 percent of a hypothetical maximum. Under emergency
conditions, the industry believes that 80 percent usage is possible. This
reserve is a result of the extra capacity water carriers require during
seasonal surges and due to unbalanced directional flow of traffic.
Additionally, most towboats do not operate at full load capacity and the
industry could add many barges to tows. [Ref .20:p.34]
In recent years, waterways have seen significant increases in water
consumption. Multiple year drought conditions have made these waterflow
constraints worse. Drought conditions limit input to the stream flow
while increasing overall water consumption.
Barge operators have responded to these water flow limitations by
limiting the loads carried by individual barges. This "light loading"
insures that the draft of the tow is not greater than the expected minimum
depth of the waterway. [Ref . 22 :p. 31 1 ] Depending on the change in priority
of water allocation and rainfall, barges could operate with heavier loads
[Ref .20:p.273]. This option provides for a significant increase in
capacity at a marginal increase in cost. The costs of moving a barge
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loaded to a nine foot draft are almost the same for moving a barge loaded
to eleven feet. [Ref . 22
:
p . 317] "As a rule of thumb, six inches in draft
is equal to 100 tons of cargo for a 35 foot by 195 foot barge."
[Ref.22:p.317]
If mobilization requires maximum use of the active floating plant,
the industry could introduce additional unused inland water equipment.
However, the depressed coal and grain markets have limited new
construction in the workboat industry. [Ref .33:p.45] The barge fleet is
showing limited growth for similar reasons. There are excesses left from
thousands of barges that shipyards built as the result of investors
seeking tax shelters. [Ref .33:p.44]
The towboat and barge industry has seen the cost of capital investment
significantly increase. A barge costing $98,000 in 1976 will cost more
than $250,000 today, depending on market conditions. [Ref .36:p.75] A new
towboat can cost anywhere from $2 to $7 million, again depending on market
conditions [Ref . 33:p.45] . Table 8 profiles new towboat construction in
the United States. New construction is primarily replacing the few U.S.
towboats that operators in South America buy each year. The industry
also uses new construction to replace the handful of towboats lost to
fires, accidents, and retirements. [Ref .33:p.46]
Towboat owners believe that the current market environment dictates
overhauling old equipment instead of buying new equipment. Companies are
refurbishing and updating. They are replacing old engines with more














Note: The results of the surveys are limited by the number of
shipyards responding to them.
* Estimate only
Source: [Ref .33:p.45]
ton miles with less fuel burned [Ref .33:p.46]. This suggests that in a
full and protracted mobilization the existing power plants would rapidly
reach their maximum cargo capacity. To expand cargo capacity, in the
short term, the industry would have to use obsolete units.
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Another method of judging maximum operational abilities is to compare
the inland waterways against the railroad. The railroad is the benchmark
against which industry frequently measures other modes of transportation.
Railroad costs of equipment, fuel consumption, labor productivity, and
repair costs are often compared to other modes when evaluating the
following three measurements: [Ref . 23:p. 275]
1. The ratio of equipment weight to carrying capacity; this measures
the most beneficial use of the nation's raw materials. A 70 ton
capacity freight car weighs 29 tons empty. [Ref . 15:p. 189] A barge
weighing 170 tons has a carrying capacity of 900 tons. Barge
transportation has a more favorable 5.3:1 ratio of equipment weight
to carrying capacity than the railroad's ratio of 2.4:1.
[Ref.23:p.l76]
2. The ratio of equipment cost and fuel consumed to carrying capacity.
In terms of cost of equipment, a ton of barge space is more
economical than a ton of railroad space. A defense dollar spent for
barge transportation will buy almost three times the cargo capacity
that a dollar invested in railroad equipment would purchase.
[Ref.23:p.276]
During a mobilization, the amount of fuel that the nation's
transportation system requires would be a major concern
[Ref .23: p. 276] . Barge transportation is the most fuel efficient
method of moving the bulk commodities that the nation would need
during a crisis. [Ref. 16] Table 9 shows the fuel efficiency of the
four major modes used to move raw materials.
3. Comparison of labor productivity and maintenance costs.
[Ref.23:p.275]
"The effectiveness of any transportation mobilization effort,
to a great extent, depends on the most effective utilization of the
nation's manpower resources." [Ref . 237 :p. 276] Barge transportation
is not labor intensive. Plus, industry can almost double the size
of a tow without any large increase in the manpower of the barge
crew. [Ref.23:p.277]
"In 1986, 5.45 million ton miles of freight were transported
for each water carrier employee." [Ref .34:p. 152] During
mobilization, barge transportation would place less than one-half
the drain on the nation's manpower resources to generate the same


















The inland waterway industry moves more than 13 percent of the
nation's freight for two percent of the nation's total transportation
cost. [Ref.16] For the movement of bulk commodities during mobilization,
barge transport would require less manpower and cost less in operating and
total costs than any other mode of transportation.
Today, the United States has a very robust inland waterway
transportation system. [Ref.l:p.35] The equipment and facilities of the
inland waterways are critical components of the nation's capacity to
operate. Inland waterway transportation contributes to the nation
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socially, economically, culturally, and for the purposes of national
defense. [Ref.l5:p.3]
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IV. CURRENT MILITARY USE OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS
A. INTRODUCTION
During World War II, the inland waterway system moved more than four
million tons of military material and equipment. War material and newly
constructed naval craft from inland factories and shipyards moved on the
inland waterways system to ocean seaports. [Ref .37:p.23] However, since
the end of that war, the military has not widely used the inland
waterways. Contracting for rail or truck transportation has been the
standard procedure for moving heavy military equipment. Decision makers
have presumed rail and truck movement to be faster, less difficult, more
customer responsive, and more cost effective.
This chapter will examine these presumptions by:
1. Providing a brief chronology of current military shipments on the
inland waterways
2. Providing a review and analysis of significant military movements of
the inland waterways
3. Comparing the various modes used for military movements
4. Providing conclusions
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B. CHRONOLOGY OF MILITARY UNIT MOVEMENTS ON THE INLAND WATERWAYS
This section provides a chronological listing of all military unit
movements on the inland waterways during the last five years. The listing
shows the date, organization, type and quantity of equipment, and
destination of the movement.
1. January 1986 - The 211th Engineer Dredge Detachment, Texas Army
National Guard (TXARNG). moved a M88 Vehicle Tank Retriever for the
United States Army Reserve (USAR). The move from Pleasure Island,
Texas to Lake Charles, Louisiana, was less than 35 miles.
[Ref.38:p.2]
2. April 1986 - The 120th Engineer Battalion, Oklahoma Army National
Guard (OKARNG), moved six tracked vehicles from Camp Gruber,
Oklahoma to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas [Ref . 38:pp. 1-2]
.
3. May 1986 - The 386th Engineer Battalion, TXARNG, moved 27 pieces of
heavy equipment from Houston, Texas to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
[Ref.38:pp.2-3].
4. June 1987 - The 120th Engineer Battalion, OKARNG, moved 34 pieces
of heavy equipment from Camp Gruber, Oklahoma to Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas [Ref .39:p.2].
5. June 1987 - The First Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery, Arkansas
Army National Guard (AARNG), moved 164 pieces of equipment from Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas to Camp Grayling, Michigan [Ref .39:p.4].
6. May 1988 - The 45th Infantry Brigade, OKARNG, moved 17 pieces of
equipment from Camp Gruber, Oklahoma to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
[Ref.40:p.l].
7. June 1988 - The Second Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery, AARNG,
moved 241 pieces of equipment from Fort Chaffee, Arkansas to Camp
Atterbury, Indiana [Ref .40:p.l]
.
8. April 1989 - The First Battalion, 189th Field Artillery, OKARNG,
moved 134 pieces of equipment from Camp Gruber, Oklahoma to Fort
McCoy, Wisconsin [Ref. 41].
9. May 1989 - The United States Army moved 12 pieces of equipment from
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas to Camp Gruber, Oklahoma [Ref. 42].
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10. September 1989 - The Second Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, moved
630 pieces of equipment from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas and Camp Gruber, Oklahoma [Ref.37].
11. January 1990 - The 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat), 101st Airborne
Division, moved 112 pieces of equipment from Fort Campbell, Kentucky
to Belize in Central America [Ref .43:p.4].
12. September 1991 - The 372nd Transportation Company, 101st Airborne
Division, moved 529 pieces of equipment from Fort Campbell, Kentucky
to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas [Ref .44:p.7].
Recent successful use of the inland waterways by Active, Reserve, and
National Guard units has encouraged the Department of Defense to
reevaluate the military value of the nations's inland waterways. These
unit movements demonstrated that waterway transport, as rail and truck
alternatives, can save transportation dollars.
C. KEY MOBILIZATION EXERCISES USING THE INLAND WATERWAYS
This section discusses four organizational moves which may influence
future mobilization plans. The section examines these key moves to
determine if there is evidence that movement by the inland waterways can
realize substantial savings in transportation cost and enhance training.
1. Oklahoma Army National Guard Movement 1986
In October 1985, the OKARNG asked the Tulsa District, Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE), to help them conduct a test move over the McClellan-
Kerr Arkansas River waterway. The test plan called for moving heavy
equipment from Camp Gruber, near Muskogee, Oklahoma to Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas. In November, OKARNG officers conducted a reconnaissance trip
over the waterway and completed drafting unit movement requirements. In
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January and February of 1986, the OKARNG made formal support requests for
use of the waterway during April 1986. [Ref.45:p.l]
On April 8, 1986, the USACE towboat Sallisaw, with a two barge tow,
arrived at Boudinot Safety Harbor, River Mile 382, near Muskogee,
Oklahoma. The Guard secured the two Army barges against the bank. The
barges were standard-sized river barges. The deck barge measured 35 feet
by 120 feet and the crane barge was 35 feet by 150 feet. The OKARNG then
built an earthen ramp from the bank to the barges for drive-on loading.
Loading of the OKARNG equipment was done on 9 April, 1986 in less than
thirty minutes. The tow left the loading site at 1230 hours, passed
through the Webbers Falls Lock and Dam at River Mile 366.5 and secured for
the night at the United States Coast Guard/USACE Terminal at Kerr
Reservoir at 1800 hours. The tow left the terminal at 0600, 10 April, and
arrived at the Fort Chaffee loading site near Lock and Dam (L&D) 13 at
1415 hours. Guard personnel unloaded the equipment in about one hour.
[Ref.45:p.2] During the period of 17-19 April, the same tow returned
the OKARNG equipment to Camp Gruber after the completion of the training
exercise.
a. OKARNG Equipment Load Manifest
The move totaled six pieces of equipment including:
1. three MI06AI mortar carriers
2. two CEV M728 combat engineer vehicles
3. one AVLB M48A2 armored vehicle launched bridge. [Ref.45:p.2]
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b. Unit Movement Analysis
Historically, the OKARNG has used commercial trucks to move
equipment between Camp Gruber, Oklahoma and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.
Therefore, the only two modes of transportation reviewed for the test
comparison were commercial trucking and commercial barges.
(1) Commercial Truck. The distance between Camp Gruber and
Fort Chaffee is approximately 70 highway miles. Past highway unit moves
have taken about two hours. The total truck bid to move the OKARNG
equipment round trip, excluding the AVLB, was $10,190.00. Truck movement
requires dismantling the AVLB. [Ref.46]
(2) Commercial Barge. The distance, by waterway, between
the two facilities is about 93 miles. The estimated cost of using a
commercial version of the USACE towboat and barges for the round trip
waterway movement was $3,700. The tow covered the 93 miles at an average
speed of 5.4 miles per hour including lock time. [Ref.46]
Table 10 provides a round trip comparison of the two modes.
TABLE 10
OKARNG MOVEMENT (1986) COST COMPARISON
Commercial Truck (bid estimate) $10,190
Commercial Barge (estimate) 3,700
Cost Savings $ 6,490
Source: [Ref.46]
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The OKARNG and USACE promoted the move as the first major unit
movement on the inland waterways since World War II. This small test
movement showed that barge transportation can be fast, easy, and cost
effective. However, the test move also showed that major benefits occur
when:
1. there is a requirement to move heavy and outsized equipment between
installations that are near and accessible to the inland waterways
2. there is enough equipment to make maximum use of available barge
deck space.
For this movement the tow was well under capacity. The test tow
carried only three mortar carriers. One commercial deck barge, similar to
the one used in the move can accommodate up to 18 M106A1 Mortar Carriers.
The incremental cost of additional fuel to move a fully loaded barge is
relatively small [Ref . 34:p. 154] . The total cost to move 18 mortar
carriers would have been about the same as moving the three carriers.
Waterborne movement allowed the Guard to load the outsized AVLB onto
the barge without any disassembly, saving labor and equipment cost.
[Ref. 46] As an added benefit, the Guard was able to use the AVLB to
unload the barged equipment at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Using the AVLB
saved additional time, labor, and equipment cost [Ref .45
:
p. 2] . Guard
officials reported no problems during the downbound or upbound movements.
[Ref.45:p.3]
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2. Texas Army National Guard Movement 1986
On May 7, 1986, the 386th Engineer Battalion, TXARNG loaded 27
pieces of combat engineer equipment on two army deck barges. The loading
site was the Roll -On/Roll -Off (RO/RO) dock, Port of Houston, Texas. The
Belmont and tow left the same day and traveled the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway (GIWW) to Morgan City, Louisiana. From Morgan City, the tow
traveled on the Port Allen Cut-off to enter the lower Mississippi at Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. The cargo then moved upstream to River Mile 599 and
entered the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River system. On 17 May, the tow
arrived at Fort Chaffee and began off-loading at the unimproved site. The
TXARNG travelled on five different portions of the inland waterway system,
transited 17 locks and covered 1,150 miles. [Ref . 38:pp. 2-3]
a. TXARNG Equipment Load Manifest
The move totaled 27 pieces of equipment including:
1. three 10-ton Trailers
2. three D-7 Caterpillars
3. one 5-ton Tractor
4. three Scoop Loaders
5. three M880's
6. two 5-ton Dumps
7. one Staff Car
8. two 2-1/2-ton Trucks
9. one Blazer
10. three Miscellaneous Trailers
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11. five Miscellaneous Vehicles [Ref.47]
b. Unit Movement Analysis
Estimated cost for water movement from Houston, Texas to Fort
Chaffee Arkansas was $15,628. Estimated costs for vehicular movement
including combination commercial truck movement and military convoy were
$57,944. [Ref.38:pp.C-19-20]
Table 11 is a simple cost comparison between the OKARNG and TXARNG
movements. The cost comparisons show that for waterborne military unit
movements to provide a major advantage, large volume per barge is
necessary. In other words, as the deck space per barge is filled up, the
savings, using water, increases. In the test movements, length of haul
did not have a major influence on the cost. [Ref.38:p.5]
TABLE 11
OKARNG AND TXARNG MOVEMENTS (1986) COST COMPARISON
OKARNG 93 Miles 6 Track Vehicles
TXARNG 1100 Miles 27 Heavy Vehicles
2 Deck Barges
2 Deck Barges







TXARNG Movement May-June 1986
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3. Arkansas Army National Guard Movement 1987
On June 7, 1987, the First Battalion, 142nd Field Artillery,
AARNG completed the on- load of seven commercial ocean-going barges. The
waterborne military convoy departed the Fort Chaffee, Arkansas loading
site enroute to Camp Grayling, Michigan for their annual training. The
military tow travelled the McClellan Kerr Arkansas River system to the
Mississippi River, then moved upstream to the Illinois Waterway and
Chicago, Illinois. From Chicago, the tow crossed Lake Michigan to the
unloading site at Frankfort Harbor, Michigan. From there, the convoy road
marched to the training area at Camp Grayling, Michigan. After completing
its annual exercise, the convoy road marched from Camp Grayling to Rock
Island, Illinois. At Rock Island, the Guard used an USACE loading site on
the Mississippi River to load their equipment on barges for the trip
downstream to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. [Ref.39:p.4]
The upstream movement covered 1,450 miles. The tow travelled on four
waterways at an average speed of about six miles per hour. The cargo
moved downstream at an average speed of seven miles per hour.
[Ref.39:pp.5-6]
a. ARARNG Equipment Load Manifest
The move totaled 162 pieces of equipment including:
12 M110A2 8-inch self-propelled howitzers. [Ref.48:p.l]
b. Unit Move Analysis
The ARARNG reviewed four modes of transportation for the
mobilization exercise: air, truck, rail, and barge.
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(1) Air Movement. Air movement was the preferred choice to
support training requirements. The exercise would have required more
than 30 C-5A aircraft because of the Guard's outsized equipment. The C-5A
aircraft were not available to the Guard due to other Military Airlift
Command missions. Estimated cost of a C-5A operation was in the millions
of dollars. [Ref.39:p.7]
(2) Road March. The ARARNG officials dropped the idea of a
road march from consideration because of two factors. Since the road
march required four days each way, movement by convoy would put the actual
training time below the minimum requirement of nine days in the field.
Additionally, road marches of this distance, over the highways, present
safety risks to the public. Road marches also create excessive wear on
the equipment. [Ref.39:p.7]
(3) Rail Movement. To move the equipment by rail would
require 82 cars. Based on previous moves, the ARARNG estimated $4,000 to
$6,000 per car. [Ref.39:p.7]
(4) Barge Movement. Barge movement was chosen because it
met both the training requirements and provided the maximum cost savings.




ARARNG MOVEMENT (1987) COST COMPARISON
Rail Cost Estimate
Cost of Rail Cars $329,600
(82 at $4,020 each)
Manpower to Load 2,000
Tie-down Teams 20,000
Tie-down Material 60,000
Total Railroad Cost Estimate $411,600
Barge Cost Estimate
Cost of Barges and Towboat $212,000
(actual contract price)










"The event was the largest movement of military equipment using
inland waterways since the 1940s." [Ref.49:pp. 24-25] The movement proved
the ability of the inland waterways to move battalion-sized organizations
while maintaining unit integrity. The event also marked the first time
the military used a commercial towing firm. It was the first contract of
this type awarded by the Military Transportation Management Command
(MTMC). The Canal Barge Company won the award and moved the ARARNG unit's
1,411 tons of equipment. [Ref.50]
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4. 101st Airborne Division Movement 1989
In August and September 1989, the Second Brigade, 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault) moved 670 pieces from its base at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas.
On 28 August, two 4,200 horsepower Canal Barge Company towboats, the
Elizabeth Ann and Walter Hagestad, pushed 42 barges into position for
loading. The loading site chosen was Lock "C" on the Cumberland River,
ten miles from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. On 30 August, military personnel
completed loading the 42 barges. In only 14 hours, soldiers had loaded
688 vehicles, two helicopters, and related equipment. The tows departed
one full day ahead of schedule and arrived at Fort Smith, Arkansas on 6
September, 1989. The Walter Hagestad pushed her tow of 19 barges to the
off-loading site at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, while the Elizabeth Ann
continued to Camp Gruber, Oklahoma with the remaining barges and arrived
at the Camp Gruber off-loading site the following day. The 101st Airborne
movement covered 829 river miles over the Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio,
Mississippi, and Arkansas Rivers. [Ref.51]
On 24 September, after completing the exercises, the 101st personnel
loaded vehicles, helicopters, and equipment on to the same barges for the
return trip. [Ref.51:pp. 14-17]
a. 101st Airborne Equipment Load Manifest
The move totaled 693 pieces of equipment including:
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1. 688 Vehicles
2. two UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopters [Ref .51 :p. 17]
b. Unit Movement Analysis
The 101st Airborne division (Air Assault) moved to Fort
Chaffee, Arkansas and Camp Gruber, Oklahoma for a JRTC exercise. This
move surpassed, in size, all previous barge movements. The two tows moved
628 vehicles, two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, and related equipment,
1,772 miles round trip. [Ref .51 :pp. 14-17] The units 4,000 tons of
equipment moved on 42 barges. This was the first mobilization by
waterborne transportation of an active Army unit since World War II.
[Ref. 52:pp. 5-12]
Another first occurred when members of the Sixth Battalion, 101st
Aviation Regiment, landed two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters directly onto
the deck barges. Soldiers secured the two helicopters in full flight
configuration for the trip. Upon arrival at the training exercise
destination, unit pilots flew the helicopters off the barges.
[Ref.53:pp.4-5]
The following two tables (Table 13, Table 14) compare the cost of the
101st movement using two modes of travel: barge and rail. Historically,
the 101st has always used rail to transport a unit of this size. The two
cost analysis studies were done independently. The major difference
between the studies appears in the helicopter cost. The analysis shown
in Table 14 does not reflect the cost incurred to fly the helicopters to
their destinations and return flight.
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TABLE 13
101 ST MOVEMENT (1989) COST COMPARISON
Barge Contract $ 743,000
Labor Cost 14,740
Total Barge Cost $ 757,740
Rail Contract $ 749,000
Labor Cost 94,370
Necessary Line Haul 174,200
Helicopter Travel 50,400
Locomotive Service 81,840
Total Rail Cost $1,069,810
Total Barge Cost 757,740
Total Savings $ 312,070
Source: [Ref.54]
TABLE 14
101ST MOVEMENT (1989) COST COMPARISON
Rail Contract $ 927,365
Labor 79,408
Total Rail Cost $1,006,773
Barge Contract $ 696,150
Labor 36,307
Total Barge Cost $ 732,457
Total Rail Cost $1,006,773
Total Barge Cost 732,457
Total Savings $ 274,316
Source: [Ref.55]
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5. 101st Airborne Division Movement 1990
On 15 January, 1990, the 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat) B
Company, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) began 'Screaming Beast 90'.
This exercise required the deployment of 112 pieces of equipment from Fort
Campbell, Kentucky to the nation of Belize, Central America.
Soldiers loaded the unit's equipment on one ocean-going barge located
at lock "C" on the Cumberland River. On 18 January, 1990, the Compass
Freedom with tow departed down the Cumberland River to the Tennessee River
and onto the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. The tow arrived at the Port of
Mobile, Alabama, on 21 January, 1990. At the port, the ocean-going
towboat, Betty G. relieved the river towboat. [Ref.56]
On 23 January, the tow left the Port of Mobile, Alabama for the
transit across the Gulf of Mexico, about 1,400 nautical miles. During the
Gulf crossing, the Betty G. towed the barge using about 1,700 of cable to
maintain control of the tow. [Ref.56]
"Averaging 8 to 8 1/2 knots across the Gulf, the tow boat was
required to slow down to 4 to 4 1/2 knots in order to not arrive at
the port in Belize prior to their scheduled clearance date of 30
January 90." [Ref.56]
The tow arrived at the Belize port on 30 January, 1990, after
completing a 2,000 mile journey. Off-loading of equipment was complete by
1 February, 1990. [Ref.56]
a. Unit Move Analysis
The decision by the 101st Airborne Division to use an
alternative transportation mode provided the following results:
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1. The onload allowed a variety of Army units to practice their
operational skills. The 372nd Transportation Company (Terminal
Transport) conducted the actual loading operations at Lock "C" on
the Cumberland River. The unimproved loading site is about ten
miles from Fort Campbell. The 41st Medium Girder Bridge Company
made a drive-on ramp by constructing a bridge from the lock wall to
the barge. Members of the 326th Medical Battalion manned an aid
station and the Law Enforcement Command provided traffic control.
A United States Coast Guard boat patrolled the river during loading
operations. [Ref.56]
The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) can deploy outside the
Continental United States using ocean-going barges. "The unit
deployed on one class 260 ocean-going barge, 260 ft x 72 ft."
[Ref.56] The actual loading began on 15 January when forklifts
started shuttle-loading 40 CONEX containers along with lumber,
fuel, and repair parts. On 16 January, the unit drove on the
rolling stock, 41 vehicles, and 29 trailers. To complete the
onload, a crane lifted two mission required pallets of bridging
sections. Total loading time for the two days was about 12 hours.
The contractor used the following day to tarp and tie down the load.
The draft of the loaded barge was only four and one-half feet. The
cargo traveled the Cumberland River, Tennessee River, and Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway on its way to Mobile, Alabama. The depth of those
waterways average nine to twelve feet year-round. Coordinated efforts from
the USACE provided priority lockage for the military tow.
The 101st placed three military supercargo onboard to accompany the
tow to Belize. The barge arrived at Belize on 30 January 1990. Docking
occurred on 31 January and off-loading of equipment began at 1400 hours.
Personnel offloaded the CONEX containers in one hour and completed all
off-loading on 1 February. [Ref.56]
There was no reported damage to the equipment and receiving
personnel noted that there was no salt from ocean spray apparent on
any of the equipment. All vehicles were in good mechanical condition
and were able to self-deploy off the barge. [Ref.56]
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D. CRITERIA FOR TRANSPORT MODE SELECTION
The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is completely familiar
with air, rail, and ground transportation. However, MTMC has limited
knowledge on how to use the inland waterways for transportation. MTMC has
had to respond to the recent interest in inland waterway unit moves on a
case-by-case basis. [Ref.5:p.l0]
The following mode selection guidance from MTMC reflects this lack of
inland navigation experience. The MTMC Engineering Agency (MTMCTEA)
Pamphlet 700-2, LOGISTICS HANDBOOK FOR STRATEGIC MOBILITY PLANNING,
provides only the following general guidance concerning mode selection for
CONUS unit equipment moves:
1. Mode selection should consider economic requirements, availability
of assets, hostile threat assessment, and any special requirements.
2. Transportation options include motor, rail, and inland waterways.
MTMC identifies inland waterways as an option for equipment that
exceeds commercial motor or rail carrier capabilities.
Guidance for the use of commercial transportation of unit equipment
includes:
1. Army units will use commercial transportation modes during
mobilization
2. Sufficient commercial resources must be available to support the
move and meet the Required Delivery Date (RDD)
3. MTMC must validate the commercial movement capability. The major
command (MACOM) must approve the move.
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Policy exceptions include
1. Organic over-the-road marches are authorized when units are located
within a one day march to the mobilization station. The unit
commander must determine that support enroute is adequate, and that
the move will not adversely affect unit equipment.
2. Organic over-the-road marches are authorized for movements greater
than the distance covered in a 24 hour period when commercial
transportation is not adequate.
E. TRANSPORTATION MODES
1. Motor Transport
Motor transport is often required for at least some cargo
movement in any mobilization. [Ref . 57 :p. 13] However, oversized and
overweight equipment are the primary restrictions for movement of units
during mobilization by motor transport. The interstate system has legal
limits of 80,000 pounds for gross vehicle weight, 8 1/2 feet for width and
13 1/2 feet for height. The legal limits on secondary roads are often
even more restrictive. Compared to these limits more than 25 Army
equipment-transporter combinations exceed the legal weight and size limits
of the nation's highways. For example, the Ml Abrams tank transported on
the M746-M747 heavy equipment transporter (HET) has a gross vehicle weight
of about 200,000 pounds. Successful highway movement of heavy equipment
requires extensive planning and coordination to prevent lost time during
mobilization and damage to highways and vehicles. [Ref.58:p.8]
Key factors influencing movement of heavy equipment by motor transport
include:
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1. Civil highway authorities will only permit oversized and overweight
defense moves when there is a clear national defense need or
emergency. [Ref .58:p.l0]
2. Vertical clearance and bridge capacity are the two most critical
factors restricting highway movement of heavy equipment. Bridge
restrictions often include: maximum speed of 5 miles per hour,
movement only along the center line, prohibition of opposing
traffic, and spacing between vehicles of at least 100 feet.
Large safety factors are routinely applied to bridge carrying
capacities. Bridge analysis techniques to determine structural load
capacity prior to convoy loadings are time-consuming. The difficult
analyses are often imprecise because of the deteriorating effects of
age and the inability to determine past loading. [Ref .58:p.l0]
3. The shortest route from origin to destination is not always the best
route for moving overweight and oversized equipment. [Ref .58:p. 10]
In part, for these reasons, organizations will usually deploy
overweight and oversized equipment by rail. Table 15 lists the motor
transporter requirements for all -motor movements.
2. Railroads
At present, rail equipment is the primary means of transport for
mobilization and deployment of active CONUS based forces.
"The railroad system, unlike motor, air, or water transport,
provides a truly nation wide network of service." [Ref .34:p.96]
This 'network of service' allows the industry to support any type and
quantity of military commodity. This flexibility is furnished by the
large carrying capacity and variety of car types. [Ref .34:p.96] Due to
the nature and time sensitivity of deployment and mobilization
requirements, railroads will, within the foreseeable future, continue to
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TABLE 15
UNIT CONVOY AND MOTOR TRANSPORTER REQUIREMENTS





























































Nonorganic assets (military or commercial) were used to move all of the unit's equipment.
a/ Unit container requirements were generated for nonvehicular dimensionally compatible equipment. Containers
were then loaded onto 40-ft flatbeds.
b/ Equipment left over after loading all motor transporters. Residuals were due to oversize, overweight, or both
(See_c/ through gj below.)
c[ Residuals consist of 16 bridges, ARM VEH LCH. Class 60. 403" a 162" x 70", 29300 lb.; 7 ramps.
load veh, 43rxl04"x44", 5,100 lb; 1 M270A1 lowbed trailer, 3 M870 40-ton trailers; and 24 M747 trailers.
(Infantry division has 6 M747 trailers as residuals.)
d/ Residuals consist of 2 ramps, load veh, and 6 M870 40-ton trailers.
c{ Residuals consist of 2 ramps, load veh, and 1 M270A1 trailer.
V Residuals consist of 6 ramps, load veh, and 2 M270A1 trailers.
jj Residual consists of 1 M270A1 trailer.
Based on J -series TOE as of November 1988
Source: [Ref .57 :p. 16]
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serve as the primary transportation mode. [Ref.4:p.l8] For example, heavy
duty fleet cars are the primary means of transporting the Army's main
battle tanks. Table 16 provides the rail loading requirements for six
different types of Army divisions.
3. Barges
Until recent years, the military did not consider the inland
waterway system as a mobilization transportation mode for unit movements.
Starting in 1986, actual waterway movements by large units of active Army
and the Army National Guard have demonstrated that cost savings are
available. However, significant cost savings occur only when unit
movements meet the following criteria:
1. When a requirement exists to transport a significant volume of heavy
and outsized equipment.
2. When the point of origination and the point of final destination are
both within a reasonable distance of the inland waterway system.
Figure 4 identifies the approximately 78 major military
installations that are accessible by the inland waterways.
F. BARGE FACTORS INFLUENCING UNIT MOVEMENTS
1. Less Energy Required
In comparison with all other modes of transport, water
transportation requires less energy for each ton moved over each mile.
Barge transportation can be two and one-half times more energy efficient
than the railroads. On the lower Mississippi River, a single 5,000
horsepower towboat often pushes a 40 barge tow. This 40 barge tow may be
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TABLE 16
RAIL LOADING REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMY














Heavy Division 1,130 1,115 254 2,499 307 82,650.4 253,415.3
Heavy Division
(Mechanized)
1,131 1.166 225 2,522 307 80,602.3 253,116.5
Infantry Division 1,161 827 107 2,095 255 47,655.8 188.952.4
Light Infantry
Division
521 215 736 172 11,445.2 61,847.2
Airborne Division 798 177 975 272 14,534.5 78.018.8
Air Assault
Division
1,018 368 1,386 380 23,653.0 137.711.9
Aviation Brigade
(Separate)
312 163 475 132 9,519.8 75,564.0
NOTE: Unit container requirements were generated for nonvehicular dimensional ly
compatible equipment and loaded onto flatcars. As of November 1988















































more than one-fourth mile in length and 200 feet wide and can have the
carrying capacity equal to 16 100-car freight trains. [Ref.28]
2. Modal Competition
Use of the barge industry generates competition among rail,
truck, and water carriers that results in reduced freight rates.
[Ref.59:p.2]
3. Shipment Preparation
On deck barges, personnel do not have to block, brace, and tie-
down each vehicle. Only the first and last rows of vehicles on the entire
tow are secured. [Ref . 51
:
p . 14] Estimates based on actual movements
project a savings of more than 60 percent over rail cost for tie-down and
bracing material. [Ref.39:p.7]
4. Loading Times
Equipment can be on- loaded or off-loaded with a minimum of
personnel. Most of the recent moves have been from unimproved sites.
Vehicles can be driven on and off even at these sites. Units can load
equipment and vehicles ready for deployment at destination. [Ref. 60]
This characteristic eliminates the requirement for decubing procedures,
which are labor and time intensive. MTMC recommends one hour goals for
decubing, although varying situations often cause decubing to take longer
than an hour. For example:
To decube a vehicle cab, lower the cab top, leaving the canvas
threaded through the top windshield canvas channel. Wrap the canvas
around the windshield and then recline it into its lowered position.
[Ref.61:p.4]
65
Experience shows a 45-50 percent reduction in loading times for barges
compared to other modes. [Ref .60] Barges can transport vehicles with full
fuel tanks, including tankers. This capability eliminates a major
logistic problem of getting fuel at the destination site.
5. Size Capability
There is minimal restriction on width, height, or weight of load.
Barges can move heavy, large, and awkward items that do not fit on truck
or rail transportation [Ref .61 :p.5] . Fifteen M35 1 1/2 ton trucks loaded
on a 120 feet by 30 feet river deck barge uses only 23 percent of the
barge's total tonnage capacity. [Ref. 63] Vehicles, including battle
tanks, will exceed the deck loading space before reaching the barge's
tonnage capacity. The smooth, steady ride of barge transport allows
activities to move aircraft in full flight configuration. For fixed wing
aircraft, like the B-52 with its 185-foot wingspan, water movement is the
only non-flight choice. [Ref.62:p.5]
6. Security
The characteristics of waterborne movement increases the security
of the equipment. Military tows are underway 24 hours a day and manned
constantly. The troops that travel on board (supercargo) not only provide
security but also perform light maintenance on the equipment. [Ref. 40]
In all the unit barge moves to date, there have been no instances
of theft, damage, or vandalism on a barge move. To preclude
vandalism, theft, or damage on rail and truck shipments, special
precautions must be taken, including tarping, blocking, bracing and
tiedowns, sealing doors, covering windshields, etc. Other than to
tie down the first and last rows of vehicles, there is no need to do
the same on inland waterway barge shipments since the mode provides
a natural barrier to such threats. [Ref.4:p.l3]
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7. Location Monitoring
Ship to shore communication over the USACE network allows for
continuous communication. The ability to monitor constantly the location
and status of unit movements is of principal importance during
mobilization. [Ref.64:p.2]
8. Total Shipment Time
Total lapsed-time for barge movement can be equal to or less than
total lapsed-time by truck or rail mode. [Ref.60] A study was done
comparing a hypothetical movement of a howitzer battalion from Tulsa,
Oklahoma to New Orleans, Louisiana. The study compared the transit times,
between water and rail, consisting of 141 pieces of equipment. Table 17
provides the breakdown of the estimated lapsed time. The larger the size
of the movement, the more time competitive becomes the barge movement.
The actual off-loading time for 688 vehicles on a barge move was seven
hours and 25 minutes. The estimated off-load for a rail operation of the
same size was 36 hours. [Ref.60] Table 18 provides average rail car
loading times.
G. SUMMARY
Actual waterway movements by both the Army National Guard and active
Army units realized significant savings when the unit movement met two
criteria. One, the unit moved quantities of heavy and outsized equipment.
Second, the waterborne movement started and ended at military
installations near the waterways.
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TABLE 17
COMPARISON OF TRANSIT TIMES FOR RAIL AND BARGE
Barge Movement
9 standard deck barges
.5 day on-loading time






3 days on-loading time
3 days transit time
1.5 days off-loading
7.5 Total Days
This conclusion is not surprising. In fact, it is consistent with the
service characteristics of water transportation. Water carriage provides
low cost service when shippers move bulk commodities in volume between
limited origins and destinations [Ref .34:p.394].
The Guard units originally made the test movements to confirm cost
savings. However, after accomplishing a series of unit moves by water,
the military discovered another major benefit. For both the Army National
Guard and the active Army, waterborne movement provided the additional
benefit of training. Their military personnel received training on a new




*AGE RAILCAR LOADING TIMES
Type of Railcar
Number
Loaded Type of Load Manpower
Time
(Hr)
~54-Ft Flatcar 1/ 10 2- 1/2-Ton Trucks (2 per Railcar)





~54-Ft Flatcar 2/ 9 1/4-Ton Trailers and Containers 10 per
railcar
8.2
60-Ft Flatcarl/ 11 2-1/2-Ton Trucks (2 per Railcar) 10 per
railcar
5.1
60-Ft Flatcar 2/ 10 Semitrailers (5 per Railcar) 10 per
railcar
8.3





89-FtTOFCi/ 12 Semitrailers with MILVANs and
Containers on Board
8 4.0
NOTES - 1/ Loaded using end ramps and vehicle's own power.
21 Loaded using forklifts/rough terrain forklifts.
3J Trailer on flatcar. Loaded using end ramps. Tractors used to drive on trailers.
Source: [Ref . 57 : p. 27")
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis addressed those aspects of the inland waterways navigation
system which could influence the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to
deploy and sustain military forces worldwide. A brief summary of the
major chapters follows:
1. Chapter II - History of the Inland Waterways System
The chapter surveyed the traffic that has moved over the inland
waterways. It also reviewed the role of the inland waterways in the
nation's economic and military development. The chapter examined three
periods in the development of the inland waterways. The first period
documented the use of rivers in their natural state and the emergence of
economic conditions that led to the canal building era. The Civil War
ended this period. The second period lasted about thirty years after the
Civil War. During this period, the railroads developed into a strong
domestic transportation mode while the inland waterways entered a period
of neglect. The third period recorded the industry's development from the
last decade of the 19th century up to the present. The emphasis of this
period was on the contributions of inland navigation to victory efforts
during both World Wars. The purpose of the historical review was to
provide a foundation for the following chapters which explored the
military potential of inland navigation.
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2. Chapter III - The Present Inland Waterways Industry
The focus of this chapter was on the adequacy of the inland
waterway industry to support national mobilization. The chapter
identified the bulk commodity groups, such as petroleum and coal ore, that
offer the most advantage for waterborne movement. Additionally, the
chapter described the principal inland waterway systems including: the
New York State Barge Canal, the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterways System,
the Mississippi River System, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterways System, and
the Pacific Coast Waterways System. The chapter also reviewed the status
of the physical equipment and facilities on the inland waterways including
locks and dams, inland ports, and the towboat and barge industry. In
addition, the chapter discussed the influence of the United States Army
Corps of Engineers on the development and management of the inland
waterways navigation system. The final section of the chapter explored
the ability of the inland waterways industry to support national
mobilization efforts.
3. Chapter IV - Current Military Use of the Inland Waterways
This chapter reviewed the military's current use of the inland
waterways by:
1. Providing a brief chronology of current military shipments on the
inland waterways
2. Reviewing four key military movements on the inland waterways
3. Comparing the various transportation modes used for military
movement
4. Identifying the advantages of using inland navigation for military
unit movements
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In recent years, Army units have made a variety of successful
waterborne movements. These dollar-saving moves have occurred at a time
of reduced defense budgets. Also, during this period, DOD directives have
tasked military commanders to better manage their dwindling resources,
including transportation dollars. Transportation costs for moving
equipment can make up a large part of an organization's operating budget.
Lessons learned from these test movements have provided new
information about the potential for increased military use of the inland
waterways. Inland waterway movement of unit equipment provides
substantial cost savings with the additional benefit of training. Using
waterborne movement allows military personnel to receive training on an
alternative transportation mode for deployment and mobilization.
B. MOBILIZATION
One accepted definition of mobilization is the swift, broad, real-time
reallocation of military and non-military resources to meet a politico-
military challenge. [Ref .65:p. 14] Mobilization involves four distinct
phases. Phase one is the movement of existing war-fighting equipment.
[Ref.4:p.l3] This phase is the most time critical. Currently, there is
no mobilization plan that includes the use of the inland waterways during
contingency operations. [Ref.23:p.l]
Phase two is sustainment. This involves the movement of large
quantities of war-fighting material such as fuel, ammunition, repair
parts, and subsistence. Barge movements of these cargos of ammunition,
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fuel, and foodstuffs are unlikely due to small individual shipment
quantities. [Ref.4:p.l3]
Phase three is economic sustainment. This is the movement of large
amounts of bulk raw materials required to sustain the nation's industrial
base. [Ref.4:p.l4] Examining the acceleration that occurred during World
War II showed that traffic of bulk raw commodities on inland waterways
increased by 26 percent. [Ref . 23
:
p. 13] Today, the inland waterway
industry has the slack capacity to support similar increases in bulk
material movements during mobilization.
Phase four is the return of equipment from overseas after the
conflict. [Ref.4:p.l4] This movement is not time sensitive. Therefore,
cost effectiveness considerations should influence decisions on
transportation modes used during this phase, such as low-cost barge
transport. Water transport cost can be lower than the costs of any other
form of transportation. Actual waterway movements by Army units have
shown that considerable savings in transportation dollars are possible.
[Ref. 4:pp. 14-15]
C. CONCLUSIONS
In the past five years, military unit movements have proved that the
inland waterway system is a valid alternative mode of transportation.
This thesis has charted the dramatic growth in the use of the inland
waterways for these unit movements. With prior planning, military units
returning from overseas deployment can benefit from the cost savings
available in using inland waterway transportation.
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Returning military units often have significant volumes of heavy
equipment. This requirement to move a quantity of heavy equipment meets
one of the two primary criteria for selecting barge transport. By
designating Gulf Coast ports as points of entry for returning units, DOD
planners can meet most of the second criterion for using inland
navigation. This second criterion is the need for origination and
destination points to be within a reasonable distance of the inland
waterway. The Gulf Intracoastal Waterways System and the Mississippi
River System connect Gulf Coast ports with 15 states located along the
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Illinois, and Tennessee rivers, and the Gulf
of Mexico. [Ref .66] Using Gulf Coast ports as points of entry minimizes
the handling of unit equipment. The Gulf Coast facilities can rapidly
transform shiploads of unit equipment into barge-loads using Roll-On/Roll-
Off (RO/RO) docks. The Gulf Coast ports shown in Table 19 are RO/RO
capable. They allow the inland navigation system to exploit one of the
advantages of barge transport which is rapid loading with minimum
personnel.
From Gulf Coast ports, industry towboats can provide low cost
transport to military installations located near the inland navigation
system. Midwestern military installations that do not have direct access
to the inland waterways can still benefit from low-cost barge
transportation. These installations can take advantage of a distribution
channel designed to provide service to the middle half of the nation.
This channel is composed of the port of New Orleans, the Mississippi
River, and the ports of Southwestern Illinois at St. Louis. [Ref. 66] The
Gulf Intracoastal Waterways System provides Gulf Coast ports with direct
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connection to this distribution channel. [Ref.66] The ports at St. Louis
are the most northerly ice-free river terminals on the Mississippi River
system. They can provide year-round operational capability for the
military. The second largest rail center in the United States is also
located in the St. Louis area. [Ref.66] Thirteen trunk line railroads
operate 28 rail-lines radiating from St. Louis. From there, rail
transport can move unit equipment to most midwestern military
installations within two days. Figure 5 shows rail transit times.
TABLE 19





New Orleans, LA 4
Baton Rouge, LA 1
Lake Charles, LA 3
Beaumont, TX 2
Port Arthur, TX 1
Houston, TX 4
Galveston, TX 2
Corpus Christi, TX 7
Note: All berths have a minimum 20-foot draft.
Source: [Ref.57:pp. 49-50]
Unit equipment loaded on barges at Gulf Coast ports of entry can reach
midwest Army installations in less than ten days transit time. For
example, barge transit time from the port of New Orleans to St. Louis is
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five days. Moving unit equipment by rail from the St. Louis area to most
midwestern installations requires one to two transit days.
This thesis has tried to extend the general knowledge of the potential
for military unit movements on the inland waterways. Further research
should concentrate on expanding the inland waterways data base. This
could be accomplished by government and industry sharing requirements and
knowledge specific to waterborne movements. This information is needed
for cost comparisons of inland navigation in relation to other
transportation modes. Similar research should also be undertaken
concerning how to include the inland navigation system in long-range
strategic planning for returning overseas deployed units.
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